The closing of the Dostoevskii brothers' journal Vremia (1861-63) has intriguing and far-reaching consequences for the evolution of Fedor Dostoevskii's political philosophy and for our sense of Russia's ideological landscape around the time of the January Uprising of 1863 in Poland. The government closed the journal due to an article about Polish-Russian relations by Nikolai Strakhov entitled "Rokovoi vopros" (A Fateful Question), which appeared in Vremia in April 1863. Government offi cials and the public alike were shocked by what they took as the article's pro-Polish sentiments and its denigration of the Russian nation. Indeed, Andrzej Walicki compares the ensuing controversy to the storm caused by Petr Chaadaev's famous "Filosofi cheskoe pisЈmo" (Philosophical Letter, 1836). 1 Acting on Alexander II's direct order, the minister of internal affairs, P. A. Valuev, closed the journal on 24 May, citing in his decision the "indecent and even subversive content" of Strakhov's article, which criticized the government and offended Russian national sentiment. The journal's general direction was also deemed "harmful. sor of his duties. 3 Strakhov's name was banned from appearing offi cially on any editorial board for the next fi fteen years. 4 The history of Russian journalism is chock full of similar postpublication censorship scandals, especially regarding national and imperial issues. 5 Yet several reasons make the episode with Strakhov worth reconsidering. First, with few exceptions, scholarly accounts tend to rely on Strakhov and Dostoevskii's postfactum protestations that the article was grossly misunderstood. As early as 1971, however, Strakhov's American biographer, Linda Gerstein, disputed this approach to "A Fateful Question." 6 Walicki's more recent analysis does not cohere with Dostoevskii and Strakhov's explanations either, though it does not overtly tackle them. 7 Gerstein's skepticism is well founded, and further reasons not to take Strakhov and Dostoevskii's explanations at face value abound. Moreover, Strakhov's article is far from an anomaly in the April 1863 issue of Vremia. On the contrary, it fi ts integrally within its platform of relinquishing Russia's rights to Poland while keeping the Western Provinces. The above claims-about the true meaning, role, and implications of "A Fateful Question"-are further supported by the articles that surround Strakhov's piece. The entire April issue of Vremia in fact presented a broad-based proposal, complete with theoretical underpinnings and policy implication, for restructuring the Russian empire into one based on tolerance and the consent of its constituent populations.
Furthermore, the implications of an alternative and more accurate account of "A Fateful Question" and of Vremia's fi nal issue are relevant not only for Strakhov but also for Dostoevskii. While Dostoevskii scholars have ignored Gerstein's brief but insightful comments about "A Fateful Question," her ideas deserve to be introduced into academic circulation within Dostoevskii studies. Dostoevskii is, after all, the one who commissioned Strakhov's article and ushered it into his journal, fully informed of its content. "A Fateful Question" and Dostoevskii's ideological evolution have to make mutual sense.
This will require revising our image of this evolution. Given Dostoevskii's well-known anti-Polish sentiments, the apparently opposite stance taken in Vremia's April 1863 issue needs greater elucidation than it has received. Likewise, Dostoevskii as a political thinker is known for his support of an assertive and militaristic Russian imperial policy and for his deeply conservative nationalism. The widely popular monojournal Dnevnik pis-atelia (A Writer's Diary), which Dostoevskii published intermittently over the years 1873 -1881, has cemented this image of the writer, but it can also be gleaned from his fi ction. Why would he lend support to anti-imperial rebels in Vremia? Building on existing research that extends Dostoevskii's political liberalism beyond his exile years, I will argue that the affair surrounding "A Fateful Question" opens up the possibility of what may be termed a democratic or tolerant phase in Dostoevskii's thinking about Russia's relation with its imperial peripheries. 8 Most fundamentally, the affair shows that Dostoevskii had a political program on national-imperial issues already in the 1860s, well before his prominent participation in the country's politics through A Writer's Diary. This program ran counter to the opinions of both the government and the vocal nationalists of the Slavophile and conservative orientation.
The Scandal and Its Dramatis Personae
Before setting their sights on Vremia, the conservative Moscow journalists Mikhail Katkov and Ivan Aksakov campaigned against Russian émigrés, particularly Aleksandr Herzen, whose London-based Kolokol supported the Polish cause. They were also scandalized by the silence of the liberal St. Petersburg press, which they took as an expression of solidarity with the Poles. 9 Strakhov's "A Fateful Question" polemicized directly with Katkov, who two months earlier called the Polish Question Russia's "fateful question" in an editorial that recommended a decisive crushing of the uprising. 10 Katkov's and Aksakov's journals soon published outraged polemics with Strakhov that doubled as denunciations. They criticized Strakhov's overly sympathetic treatment of the Poles as a galling lack of patriotism and as political recklessness: What will foreigners say? That the Russians agree with the Poles? The foreigners in question did take notice. Assuming the article was Dostoevskii's, the French Revue des deux mondes reprinted "A Fateful Question" as evidence of Russian support for the rebels. 11 By withholding Strakhov's name and signing the article "Russkii" 13 Katkov, the owner of Moskovskie vedomosti, was a powerful political fi gure. His outspoken attacks against the Poles and calls for a decisive defeat of what he saw as a grave separatist threat to the empire made his the most important public voice in Russia. Andreas Renner calls him "the opinionmaker of 1863"; Herzen was right that Katkov's denunciation wielded a "terrible power." 14 In his propagandistic articles, Katkov skillfully stoked the fi res of nationalism, portraying Poland as a political vampire raised from the dead to drink Russian blood. 15 Recent accounts of Katkov's political journalism credit him and his like-minded nationalists with introducing far-reaching changes in the political culture of the empire, such as "inventing from below" the Russifi cation policy of Alexander III. 16 Katkov shaped, rather than propagated, the government's agenda. 17 For Fedor Dostoevskii, another key persona of the scandal, the year 1863 marked the pinnacle of his postexile rehabilitation-with both the 18 Unlike the Slavophiles, pochvenniki did not reject the benefi ts that accrued to Russia as a result of westernization. Unlike the Westernizers, they saw value in some traditional Russian institutions and in tapping native spiritual resources. Westernization was a necessary phase, but the pochvenniki held that the Russian nation now needed to be infused by native springs. To this end, the educated, westernized nobility and intelligentsia was to "relearn" Russianness from the lower, uneducated classes. This would heal the crippling social rift, bring about mutual respect, and create a superior national alloy.
Strakhov did much to render this philosophy coherently on the pages of Vremia. Dostoevskii valued Strakhov's enormous erudition and his training in philosophy and natural sciences. 19 Though he wrote prodigiously on a variety of scientifi c subjects, Strakhov made his mark most memorably as a literary critic and a tireless campaigner against the "nihilists" of the radical left. In the 1860s, the intellectual bond between Dostoevskii 23 On the face of it, it does not seem to make sense. The standard explanation for this apparent anomaly, based entirely on Dostoevskii and Strakhov's own subsequent explanations, is that the general public and governmental authorities misunderstood vaguely worded passages. In a letter to Ivan Turgenev from June 1863, Dostoevskii calls Strakhov's article "in the highest degree patriotic" and protests: "You know the direction of our journal: it is mainly a Russian direction and even anti-western. Would we take the Poles' side?" But he also admits that "there were some infelicitous expressions and vague places [nedomolvki], which gave rise to false interpretations. These vague places, we now see, were indeed quite serious, and we are responsible for them." Dostoevskii had hoped, he tells Turgenev, that the journal's general orientation, by which he means its championship of Russian nationalism, would have prevented a malicious reading of these "vague places." The point of the article, as Dostoevskii explains it to Turgenev, was that the Poles hate the Russians so much that peaceful coexistence with them will long be impossible. He complains that people took it to mean that Vremia considers the Poles right. True, the article says that the Poles consider themselves superior to the Russians, but-Dostoevskii assures Turgenev-it does not accept 22. Dostoevskii's relations with Strakhov began to deteriorate after Epokha closed down due to low subscriptions. Scholars disagree about the degree and duration of the two men's affi nity. In A. S. Dolinin's view, their differences were personal rather than ideological. Ibid., 253. For a view of Dostoevskii According to Strakhov, he and Dostoevskii embarked on a fl urry of letter writing to various journals to set the record straight. Replying to Moskovskie vedomosti, Dostoevskii apparently complained of the public's incorrect interpretation and steadfastly stood by Strakhov. 26 Thanks to eased censorship, Strakhov proudly republished "A Fateful Question" in his BorЈba s zapadom v nashei literature (The Struggle with the West in Our Literature, 1897), along with two rebuttals that he claimed to have sent, back in 1863, to Moskovskie vedomosti and DenЈ. The rebuttals exude a faith in the power of Russian culture and harsh criticisms of the haughty Poles that, as we will see, are absent from the original article. Instead of a genuine explication of the fateful article, the rebuttals offer a manipulative reinterpretation that rescues Strakhov as a nationalist and exonerates him from the charge of political apostasy. 27 Critics, cultural historians, and biographers of Dostoevskii have tended to rely on Dostoevskii and Strakhov's retroactive clarifi cations. 28 This includes the otherwise perspicacious Joseph Frank, who sums up well the customary approach to "A Fateful Question": "Although intended as a public avowal in favor of the Russian cause, [Strakhov's article] was written in such tortuous and elusive terms that it could easily be misread as a justifi cation of the desperate Polish revolt." Frank also adds, though, that "Strakhov does paint Polish civilization in such glowing colors that the misunderstanding is quite comprehensible." 29 Scholars whose principal object of study is not Dostoevskii have been less invested in corroborating his and Strakhov's elucidations when examining "A Fateful Question." Gerstein has found these elucidations unreliable: "There is nothing particularly vague about 'Russkii's' article, and [Strakhov's] explanations are disingenuous. His point was that Russia, by the criteria which she herself accepts, did not deserve to dominate Poland; she would have to earn this by developing a civilized future, on spiritual rather than political terms." Walicki fi nds in Strakhov's article "an impressive objectivity and even sympathy" for the Polish view of their cultural superiority over the Russians: " [Strakhov] not merely an arrogant illusion, that the Polish superiority was not imaginary but quite real." According to Olga Maiorova, Strakhov juxtaposed "with shocking candor" the Polish nation-"vibrant, active, possessed of a highly advanced culture"-with the Russian one "that remained passive and insuffi ciently developed." 30 These balanced assessments of "A Fateful Question" offer reasons to approach Dostoevskii and Strakhov's testimony cautiously. After all, they would have certainly been invested in containing the political fallout from the affair. The article is not "tortuous and elusive," as Frank sayscertainly not any more or less so than anything else Vremia published or Strakhov wrote. It becomes "tortuous and elusive" only if we try to reconcile it with Dostoevskii and Strakhov's retroactive insistence that no support for the Poles was intended. In fact-and here is where I depart from Walicki's argument-Strakhov elaborates very good reasons why the Poles might wish to separate from Russia and fl eetingly suggests that this may happen. 31 Strakhov does not call for offering Poland independence, but his broad historiosophic discussion of Polish-Russian relations makes this outcome entirely reasonable. Moreover, with the exception of Gerstein, even recent rereadings of "A Fateful Question" maintain that Strakhov's true emphasis was on the Russian nation's future victory over the Polish nation, superior only superfi cially. 32 True, Strakhov closes with hopes that the potential locked in the common Russian people may one day lead the nation to greatness, but these comments are merely hypothetical and timid projections rather than convinced prophesies. So anemic was Strakhov's assertion of Russian glory that Vladimir Kantor has recently surmised that it was aimed to merely mollify the censor. 33 "A Fateful Question": Textual Evidence Strakhov invites his readers to look at the Polish question from the Poles' own perspective: they consider themselves a superior, civilized culture, and view Russians as barbarians. Dostoevskii assured Turgenev that the article did not endorse the Poles' infl ated self-perception but rather attacked it (Strakhov's rebuttals echoed this). But this is misleading and untrue. In fact, Strakhov himself nearly admitted as much in a private conversation with Nikitenko. 34 35 In demonstrating historic Polish superiority, Strakhov invokes Ivan Kireevskii's expertise. His quote from Kireevskii calls the Polish aristocracy in the fi fteenth and sixteenth centuries, with some exaggeration, "the most learned in Europe," stresses the Poles' knowledge of foreign languages and cultures and their rich tradition of translations, especially from the classics. Kireevskii also notes that already during Sigismund III's reign (1587-1632), Poland had eighty printing presses and over seven hundred known writers. 36 Contrary to Dostoevskii's and Strakhov's denials, the article portrays the Poles in a positive light. Strakhov refers to their struggle for independence as "infi nitely heroic," being rooted, as Walicki put it, in "the moral impossibility of accepting a situation in which a cultural European nation fi nds itself under the rule of uneducated barbarians." 37 "The unfortunate nation!" Strakhov exclaims with pity:
Given your high opinion of yourself, how strongly you must feel the entire incompatibility of your position! The higher your civilization, the more subtle your sentiments, the more sophisticated your speech-the deeper your sufferings, the more insufferable appears to you any preponderance whatsoever on the side of your less civilized rivals. Your high culture is your punishment. Where a different tribe could have been pacifi ed and subdued, you in no way can.
Strakhov claims that the Russians have always admitted that these Polish sentiments have "a degree of justice" to them. He goes so far as to justify Poland's claims to the Belorussian and Ukrainian territories on account of its past civilizing successes in these areas. 38 Strakhov thus fl ies in the face of Russian public opinion, which was particularly incensed by Polish insurgents' demands in both 1831 and 1863 for Poland's former east Slavic possessions that Russia now claimed as "Russian. two possibilities: 1) to prove that Russians are not in fact barbarians, or 2) to prove that Polish civilization is "not genuine, but carries death in its very root." 39 The second phrase became Strakhov's refrain in his campaigns of self-defense. Dostoevskii invokes it to Turgenev when denying that Vremia pronounced Polish culture superior to the Russian. Nothing of the sort, Dostoevskii argues: "we said it literally, that the praised Polish civilization has carried and carries death in its heart. This we said in our article literally." 40 But they did not. Although this statement about Polish civilization's deadened core is the most conducive to Dostoevskii and Strakhov's reinterpretations, it is hypothetical rather than declarative. It appears alongside the equally plausible possibility that Russians are barbarians-the very claim that Dostoevskii and Strakhov later try to erase. Because its national development is in an early phase, Russia as yet cannot, in Strakhov's opinion, deny a charge of "barbarity." It can only muster negative evidence: it did not become Polonized and it bypassed Poland when westernizing. Alas, Strakhov soberly concludes, this "negative evidence" only proves that Russians have preserved themselves intact and are now "ready" to develop their nationality. But he warns that "more than that cannot be concluded from this." 41 Strakhov is basically a skeptical patriot. Like Chaadaev, he wished for Russia's national coherence and confi dence, yet was unwilling to fudge the evidence to prematurely proclaim this goal as accomplished.
Confronting the second possibility, Strakhov wonders if the Poles' civilization, in view of their loss of independence, was indeed sickly and abnormal. "If we suppose this," Strakhov hypothetically continues, "we might point to Polish civilization's un-Slavic foreignness and its lack of grounding in the life of the people." The trouble is that Strakhov instantly snips this line of inquiry and, moreover, suggests that this is Russians' wishful thinking, a mere consolation in which they should be indulged: "Let us judge the matter this way and comfort ourselves with the thought that the fate of Poland is its inevitable inner fate. But such consolations are only part of the matter [Ne v takikh utesheniiakh vse delo]." 42 This "consolation" clarifi es the article's importance for Dostoevskii as Vremia's editor. As a hypothetical exercise, the notion of Polish civilization's deadened core offers an instructive lesson for Russia to resist the kind of westernization that may have deracinated the Poles and severed their nobility's link to the people. This smacks, of course, of Dostoevskii's pochvennichestvo, Vremia's underlying ideology. This moment also clarifi es Vremia's and-by extension, Dostoevskii's-apparent championship of the Poles. It is absolutely essential to understand that the Poles' fate is quite secondary to the lessons it might offer to Russian nationalism. As for Katkov, the "fateful question" from the title is less about Poland than 39 Yet Strakhov values the needs of the Russian nation over those of the Russian empire more than Pushkin did. The article does not defend the Poles but promotes Dostoevskii's brand of Russian nationalism. Vremia uses the Polish question merely to do what it had always been doing: prodding the Russians to become more Russian and affi rming each nation's right to organic development. Only once Russia develops its own national culture will it become an equal of European ones. Only then, Strakhov adds, will Russia's claim to the Ukrainian-Belorussian rim trump the Polish one. 44 In closing, Strakhov articulates two tasks that will help resolve the "fateful question." The Russians must devote themselves to developing a truly national culture that is harmonious with their inner spirit. The Poles must renounce their pride because it leads to demands that may not be satisfi ed, in pursuit of which they bear undue sacrifi ces.
Reading Strakhov's article forces us to consider Dostoevskii's complaints about misunderstanding as an unconvincing attempt at damage control. In my view, Dostoevskii's and Strakhov's explanations belong to the Russian tradition of political apologia offered after offending the country's national pride. This tradition includes Chaadaev's 1837 "Apologiia sumasshedshego" (Apology of a Madman), which elucidated and recanted his "Philosophical Letter" as well as Nikolai GogolЈ's explanatory texts to his Government Inspector and Dead Souls, works whose nationalism the public found to be suspect. 45 The public in fact understood the article well but focused on what for Strakhov and Dostoevskii was secondary: the culture of the Poles and its comparison to Russian culture. For the Vremia editors this was a preliminary step toward an argument about the Russian nation. But the public was less interested in that argument and saw the comments about superior Polish civilization as treason and political folly.
Beyond its blow to triumphalist, state-centered nationalism and to the sensitivities of a public reared in its spirit, the article had very uncomfortable implications for Russia's imperial ideology. Given Russia's imperial 43 48 Overall, Strakhov offers no practical political solutions, but any reader would be justifi ed to see in his article an implicit support for the rebel cause and a critique of the government's policy.
By publishing Strakhov's article, could Dostoevskii have supported Polish independence and the shrinking of the Russian empire's western dominions? Anyone familiar with his later views on Russia's relations with the Slavic world might doubt this. A Writer's Diary, especially its entries about the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, strikes a very different tone. Dostoevskii, by then a revered national prophet, adamantly proclaimed Russia's leadership in the Slavic world and its "manifest destiny" to gather all the less fortunate, that is, stateless, Slavs. The Russia of A Writer's Diary is a confi dent, expansionist Russia that never retreats and never questions its mission civilisatrice. But, as is well known, the Dostoevskii of the early 1860s was ideologically more liberal than the Dostoevskii of the late 1870s and beyond. Could he have had a different national-imperial program in the early 1860s? January 1863 issue. Avoiding any predictable Pole-bashing, the account in the section "Sovremennoe obozrenie" (Contemporary Survey) simply regrets the spilling of "brotherly blood" on both sides and hopes that the disturbances will not escalate. 49 In February Vremia abandons any reporting of news from the ground, which the government made amply available, perhaps signaling its distrust of offi cial sources. 50 The next two issues focus instead on western European governments' responses to the confl ict, particularly the likelihood of their military and fi nancial aid to the Poles, which worried Russian offi cials and public opinion in the uprising's early months. 51 The March issue reports favorably and at length on a speech by a Mr. Billeaud ("BilЈo" in Cyrillic) who apparently advocated French noninvolvement from the fl oor of the French Senate. Billeaud praises Alexander II's reforms, which put Russia on the course of "civilization and progress." He argues that Polish affairs distract Russia's attention from this worthy domestic agenda, especially its transition from serfdom, whose success, in the fi nal analysis, outweighs any benefi t that may accrue to Russia from its control of Poland. Vremia thus cites a foreign source to raise the controversial idea that renouncing Poland may in fact benefi t Russia. 52 Indeed, Billeaud's remarks anticipate the position of Vremia's next, fateful issue of April 1863, which openly opposed the government's handling of the Polish Uprising. To say that Vremia sympathized with Polish demands for independence would sound misleadingly idealistic. Rather, Vremia framed its recommendation in terms of ridding Russia's body of a festering limb. The larger textual package of the entire issue indicates that Strakhov's article forms part of a well-articulated and coherent platform on the Polish Question and on the politics of the imperial state. Roughly three-fourths of the 260-page section "Sovremennoe obozrenie" relates in some way to these issues. This thematic focus and the texts' mutual consistency suggest a conscious editorial decision and a bold political gamble by the Dostoevskii brothers. It is a gamble they promptly lost. The mission proved politically suicidal because it collided with the government's policy of maintaining imperial possessions at all cost.
The articles surrounding "A Fateful Question" provide the political applications to Strakhov's theoretical-cultural schema and collectively drive home Vremia's point: the war costs Russia millions of rubles and thousands of lives. Given the Poles' intransigence, these resources would be better spent on domestic needs, preeminent among them land fi nancing for recently liberated serfs (their obligation to remunerate landlords for the land was widely seen as a de facto continuation of serfdom). Vremia's inclination to let Poland go was thus motivated-and this is key-not by idealistic solidarity with the Polish cause but by nationalist concerns for Russia's welfare, concerns that animate the journal's larger critique of the 49 54 While Strakhov provides a cultural and historical justifi cation for disengagement, the news sections chime in with pragmatics. 55 Razin's "Our Home Affairs" defends Russian suzerainty over the predominantly Orthodox and "Russian" Western Provinces (comprising the Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian territories), to which Poland lay claims. The Polish kingdom, he writes, is a different matter: ethnically Polish, overwhelmingly Catholic, run by Polish civil servants, and served by a host of separate institutions. Razin sees only two ways of dealing with it. One is to erase Poland's autonomy and effect a complete political and institutional merger with Russia. The other is to cut Russia's losses and abandon the Polish kingdom while keeping the Western Provinces. This clearly emerges as a preferred, pragmatic solution. The Poles have exhausted Russia; they are a "painful ulcer" that should be speedily cut off, only without the meddling of west Europeans:
Common sense dictates getting rid of this painful ulcer [boleznennyi narost] as fast as possible, by means of an operation, if necessary. However, Russia does not wish for . . . someone else to perform this operation. History tends toward the gradual smoothing out of national antagonisms. But this is the more easily accomplished the less one uses violence. . . . Russia entered the path of "expanding social rights" and of "broadening the scope of activity entrusted to the empire's various local institutions." There is no doubt whatsoever that once this path becomes more clearly and tangibly marked, all Slavs-on their own, without any efforts or sacrifi ces on our part-will cling to Russia with full sympathy. 56 Then Poland will join Russia of its own will, perhaps will beg for it. And rather than a weakness, Poland will then represent the strength of the Renouncing Poland does not mean renouncing empire, the article claims, thus disagreeing with the government's view of Poland as the empire's linchpin. All Slavs will eventually join Russia, but the union must be voluntary if it is to be strong. In light of what happened later-Russia's ruthless quashing of the uprising, severe reprisals against the insurgents, and the policy of depolonization under Mikhail "The Hangman" Muravev-the notion of renouncing the Kingdom of Poland while holding on to the Western Provinces sounds radical. Nevertheless, profound skepticism that the Poles would ever reconcile themselves to Russian rule was widespread in the uprising's early stages, giving rise to serious consideration of this option even in government circles. Vremia made the mistake of voicing it publicly. Months later even Katkov frames the two solutions to the Polish Question as the choice between total incorporation and partial decolonization. 58 In his international news segment, Razin reiterates these two solutions, predicting that if Poland's complete unifi cation with Russia is impossible, "Russia will completely get rid of Poland [izbavitsia ot PolЈshi], on which are unnecessarily wasted both millions [of rubles] and many tens of thousands of lives." 59 Indeed, the tremendous cost of keeping Poland was hotly debated at the time by government offi cials and the public. 60 The mention of needlessly spilt Russian blood and a colossal waste of money echoes both Razin's domestic news segment and "A Fateful Question." 61 Razin argues that the money spent on the Polish adventure could have paid for the liberated serfs' land and made Russian economy, arts, and sciences fl ourish.
The next and fi nal article in the issue, P. P. SokalЈskii's provocative "Nashi glavnnye spornye punkty" (Our Main Points of Contention), argues that the state should get out of the business of managing nationalities altogether. Strakhov sees the state as irrelevant, but SokalЈskii claims that it is harmful. In his view, politicians play irresponsibly with nationalities, not realizing that violence and despotism only breed hatred. SokalЈskii is adamant that imperial states must be voluntary unions, based on mutual respect and "love." Tolerance need not lead to the demise of the Russian empire. A gentler touch will ensure, SokalЈskii here echoes Razin, that other nationalities will cling to Russia of their own free will. They will see that "life is good under our patronage and will fi rmly join us." 62 Vremia basically rejects institutional and coercive Russifi cation and favors instead creating conditions for "Russianization" (obrusenie) or a "self-chosen" act of spontaneous cultural assimilation. 63 This fi t within the contemporary ideal of grazhdanstvennostЈ, or the creation of the imperial civil society. 64 Needless to say, all of this constituted a political program that challenged the government's treatment, not only of Poles (who are barely mentioned, if clearly implied), but also of other imperial minorities. 65 SokalЈskii articulates a coherent, theoretically grounded alternative to the state's imperial policy. He never addresses specifi c recommendations to the Russian government, but his aim is obvious: Russia should reject coercion and militarism, which produce only ephemeral results, in favor of what may be termed a consensual empire. He argues that the state should not interfere in the lives of nationalities or try to amalgamate them by force. They should be free to develop and compete in the realm of culture so that, ultimately, "the stronger civilization will take the upper hand and the task of progress will be accomplished freely." 66 Tolerance for constituent nationalities is a must in SokalЈskii's vision of an empire by consent. He insists that, contrary to popular assumptions, such an empire would strengthen the state. For this empire to emerge, however, Russia must develop its inner spiritual resources and national self-knowledge. This to SokalЈskii represents Russia's true epochal task and its only guarantee of progress.
Many other articles in the March and April issues of Vremia obliquely promote such organic national work, making the empire self-sustaining and basing it on the consent of its constituent ethnicities. A. Bibikov criticized the army's Byzantine bureaucracy and bloated budget, campaigning for decentralization, cost-cutting, and genuine civilian controls over military expenditures. The ongoing military operation in Poland and the well-known fact that the military draft there helped spark the uprising correlate Bibikov's discussion of army reforms with the Polish imbroglio. 67 62. P. P. SokalЈskii, "Nashi glavnnye spornye punkty," Vremia, no. 4 (1863) 65. For example, SokalЈskii harangues against the persecution of the Ukrainian language-a policy that conservative papers supported (e.g., DenЈ or Biblioteka dlia chteniia). He claims that the Russians are hypocritical in defending the national rights of the Czechs, the Serbs, or the Slovaks, that is, Slavs who happen to reside in other empires, while restricting these same rights at home; see SokalЈskii, "Nashi," 254. P. Tkachev's "Nashi budushchie prisiazhnye" (Our Future Jurors) takes up the cause of empowering the people vis-à-vis the state through a trial by jury, which is seen as the only guarantee of a nation's political rights.
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This would help counteract the "voicelessness" (bezmolvie) of the people that M. Rodevich decries as the fundamental condition of Russian society in the post-Petrine era. Rodevich describes the relation of Russian subjects to their state as passive spectatorship of a "public gathered around an air balloon" or a swarm of insects around a giant, who notices the insects' existence only when stung. 69 The article recounts historical examples of Russia's absolute rulers' abuses of the people, including arbitrary deprivations of life and private property. The leitmotif of the nation's "voicelessness" reverberates in the article as a call to Russians to demand to be heard. Addressing explicitly imperial questions, Vasilii P. Popov's April article "Prestuplenia i nakazania" (Crimes and Punishments) chastises the British empire for exiling criminals to far-off colonies and using corporal punishment. This could easily be read as Aesopian criticism of Russia's own widespread use of colonial exile: "A nation that proudly holds itself as the head of civilization indulges in barbarity that is fi t for savages!" 70 Strakhov's article, which similarly questions Russia's pretensions to "civilization" and asserts its penchant for "barbarity," begins only three pages after these words. Popov's review sees neither correctional nor colonial benefi t in exiling prisoners to peripheral regions and argues that voluntary colonization should replace exile. 71 The fi nal companion piece to "A Fateful Question" worthy of note is a long review of Mykola Kostomarov's Istoriia severnykh narodopravstv (A History of Northern Republics, 1863), warmly greeted in a footnote by the journal's editors. Kostomarov was a Ukrainian historian and a vocal supporter of imperial federalism. 72 Such federalism, according to Kostomarov, was rooted in Kievan RusЈ and meant that "independent parts . . . without suspending their separate existence, all jointly formed one state body." The review details federalism's workings in the medieval city-states of Novgorod and Pskov, which involved free elections and citizens' infl u- ence on public affairs. Printed anonymously, the review was authored by P. V. Znamenskii, a future historian of medieval RusЈ, who sympathizes with the fi erce independence of ethnic, political, and kinship factions within the city-states and paints their federal union as a viable "national ideal" (narodnyi ideal). He presents the city-states' incorporation into Muscovy as a violent solution that truncated an organic historical process. 73 The review's examples smack of a messy, nascent democracy, which contrasts sharply with the "voicelessness" of Rodevich's Russians during the postPetrine period. Znamenskii comes close to calling for the continuation of the interrupted business of federalism. 74 In short, the fi nal issue of Vremia stages a concerted effort to put the interests of the Russian nation above those of the Russian empire and to propose an alternative vision of this empire: one based on tolerance and consent of the governed minorities. Under the guise of history, Vremia asserts the idea of federalism as a viable ideal organically rooted in Russian history. Possible territorial losses incurred in pursuit of a consensual-or federal-empire will prove temporary; a stronger domestic core will eventually buttress the empire. Many articles critique the costly and ineffective current imperial policy, which relies on coercion and war. Strakhov's contribution dismantles the classic Russian justifi cation for imperial sovereignty over Poland. The issue's other articles, unfazed by the prospect of an independent Poland, advocate a halt to the violent suppression of the Polish Uprising. The underlying sentiment-this merits emphasis-is not sympathy for the Poles, but concern for the Russian nation's welfare and the empire's viability. To use a modern metaphor, Vremia wants to press the "reset" button in the empire's management.
What Does Vremia Tell Us about Fedor Dostoevskii?
The postexile period up to the spring of 1863 represents a time when Dostoevskii experimented with alternative and unorthodox ideas about the Russian empire-ideas that the April 1863 issue of Vremia puts into focus. This episode reveals a stage in the evolution of Dostoevskii's national and imperial ideology so far unnoted in the scholarship. Dostoevskii's interest in imperial politics predates by far the punditry of his Writer's Diary phase. He appears, moreover, to have supported the shrinking of the Russian empire in the west. He believed that an expensive imperial agenda drained resources from more crucial domestic priorities, such as education and land reform.
While Vremia's ill-fated April 1863 issue thus modifi es our understanding of this specifi c moment in Dostoevskii's ideological evolution, it also Of course, one cannot assume that any idea printed in Vremia enjoyed Fedor Dostoevskii's personal support. We do know, however, that he did the heavy lifting of editing and shepherding submissions through censorship (his brother mainly looked after the business side of things). He worked hard to put the April issue together. He personally solicited, read, and supported Strakhov's article. The editors did not distance themselves from the views expressed, an option they did exercise on other occasions. 77 The degree of focus and mutual consistency in the constellation of ideas regarding the Polish and imperial questions signal a conscious editorial move. The cogency and focus of Vremia's April issue is unlikely to have been a matter of chance. Its general agenda must have met with Dostoevskii's approval.
Dostoevskii's unpublished comments about the uprising and Poland did come down to us in his "Notebook for 1863 -1864." These comments, however, follow the scandal of "A Fateful Question" by roughly a year, showing us a Dostoevskii who was already reacting to the crisis, reevaluating and modifying his positions. Still, these notes reveal a fl uid adjustment rather than a complete reversal of the political sentiments of April 1863. Here is a selection from Dostoevskii's "Notebook":
1. By freeing the peasants in Poland and giving them land, Russia thus shared its idea with Poland, inculcated Poland with its own character, and this idea is a link [tsepЈ] by which Poland and Russia are now inseparably united.
2. Whoever defends too strongly the unity that Russia achieves by violent means, no matter what, doubts the power of the Russian spirit, does not understand it, and if he understands it, then clearly wishes it ill. I myself will support the political unity of this mass [gromada] to the last drop of my blood, because this is the only good result of Russia's thousand years of suffering. But this is not the main thing: (what is the main thing).
3. Universality [obshchechelovechnostЈ] can only be achieved through each nation's insistence on its own nationality. The idea of pochva, of nationalities, is the basis. The idea of nationality is a new form of democracy.
4. The Polish war is a war of two forms of Christianity-it is the beginning of a future war between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, or, in other words, between Slavic genius and European civilization. And so: our development, but not of the offi cial kind (on the Dutch program), but a national one [narodnoe] . 78 These notes show Dostoevskii's evolving views on the Polish and imperial questions that resonate with ideas from Vremia while avoiding a collision course with the authorities, which the editors of Epokha could not afford. Strakhov found nothing in the way of civilizational benefi t to Poland from Russia's imperial sovereignty. After Alexander II's edict of 19 February 1864, which freed Poland's serfs and gave them land, Dostoevskii seems to have found this benefi t (entry 1, above). 79 The liberation of the Polish serfs represents an idea that Dostoevskii and Strakhov would like to see as cementing the empire: idea instead of war (entry 2). It is the kind of idea that in April 1863 they apparently could not fi nd and that the very minister who banned Vremia apparently could not fi nd either. 80 81 Though Poland is not mentioned, any such reorientation would necessarily involve it. Again, this puts Vremia's idea of an empire free from the "Polish ulcer" within Dostoevskii's ideological perimeter. The 1873 entry "Mechty i grezy" (Dreams and Musings), much like Vremia a decade earlier, ponders the cost of empire and recommends reallocating the military budget to education. 82 This shows important continuities with Vremia's platform in the least likely of sources.
The idea of empire by consent also fi ts integrally with other aspects of Dostoevskii's postexile ideology. Nancy Ruttenburg has recently explored Dostoevskii's intense interest in the idea of democracy by analyzing The House of the Dead (the fi ction that ran in Vremia a year prior). She claims that following his exile in a crowded prison camp, "Dostoevskii envisioned a new world in which [a] mandated physical proximity would have been converted into a consensual national-spiritual unity, the basis of his democratic vision." 83 Ruttenburg also demonstrates that, in Dostoevskii's view, social life based on "common consent" was deeply rooted in the Russian people. 84 In promoting Vremia's model of a consensual empire, Dostoevskii may have thus merely extended the homegrown Russian ideal of "common consent," consistent with his pochvennichestvo ideal of reorganizing Russian life in line with Russian national values. Vremia's new imperial model simply applies to a larger political arena the principle of Russian democracy that Ruttenburg traces in illuminating detail in Dostoevskii's prison-camp fi ction. After all, as his aphoristic statement from the "Notebook" shows, early Dostoevskii viewed national aspirations in terms of legitimate democratic demands: "The idea of nationality is a new form of democracy."
The authorities promptly stepped in to make sure that this visionincluding calls for consensual empire, its subordination to the needs of the Russian nation, and noises about federalism-would not be propagated. Vremia wanted the people to be citizens of the empire; the government treated them as imperial subjects. Vremia wanted an empire based on civic institutions; the government wanted one based on the army and the police. The Dostoevskii brothers understood this and retreated, likely prompted by some combination of a genuine change of heart and the pragmatics of practicing journalism in a repressive state. Even the censors found Vremia's successor, Epokha, anodyne, noting its rapproachment with the Slavophile DenЈ and Katkov's Moskovskie vedomosti-the very journals that brought Vremia down. 85 The experience of penal servitude in a multiethnic Siberian prison camp on the border with Central Asia no doubt prompted Dostoevskii to refl ect on Russia's imperial course, just as a journey to Sakhalin later tempered Anton Chekhov's heady support of Russia's colonial mission. 86 While in Omsk, Dostoevskii gained fi rsthand experience of the phenomenon that Beth Holmgren has recently dubbed "the indigestible Pole." 87 In fact, The House of the Dead, which describes Polish inmates, offers additional evidence why Vremia's fi nal issue, far from being a reckless editorial oversight, refl ected Dostoevskii's own politics. This fi ctionalized autobiography suggests that Dostoevskii found the Russifi cation of "indigestible" Poles doomed and not worth the effort. Of all ethnicities in the camp, the Poles most consistently fail all tests of national-imperial togetherness. The moment of their closest contact with the Russian people takes place during the Christmas theatricals, which harmonize all tensions and bring together representatives of all ethnic, political, and confessional factions. The theatricals scene in The House of the Dead and Vremia's last issue reinforce each other's message: only Russian culture and ideas can gain the hearts and minds of the minorities. Violence and oppression never will.
Indeed, Dostoevskii's descriptions of the Poles in The House of the Dead are less venomous than in his later fi ction. The narrator often rationalizes the Poles' behavior, reminding his readers that their noble status and greater remove from their homeland call for understanding:
All of [the Poles] were morally ill [bolЈnye nravstvenno], bilious, irritable, and mistrustful. This is understandable: their lot was very hard, much harder than ours. They were far from their homeland. Some of them had long terms-ten, twenty years. And most importantly, they looked at the people who surrounded them with deep prejudice, seeing in the prisoners only brutality. They could not-did not even want to -see in them a single good trait, anything human. This too was understandable: this point of view was unfortunately forced on them by circumstances, by their fate. It was clear that melancholy [toska] was suffocating them. 88 Dostoevskii also notes the Poles' instances of integrity and bravery. For example, he reports how one Polish convict carried in his arms a sick comrade during their long journey on foot between prisons. 89 Interestingly, the serialization of The House of the Dead offered Dostoevskii hints that the government was highly sensitive on the subject of Poland-hints that he nonetheless disregarded in 1863. The censors held back the chapter devoted to the Polish political prisoners (Part II, Chapter 8, "Companions"), which was published out of sequence half a year after the work's serialization ended. 90 Only one out of three editions of The House of the Dead during Dostoevskii's lifetime included it. It seems incredible that the description of the hell-like bathhouse or of the consumptive Russian prisoner dying in fetters-the episodes that truly shocked the Russian audience-seemed to the authorities less incendiary than the much less graphic descriptions of the mistreatment of Polish political prisoners. This shows that the state placed a high premium on its imperial commitment in Poland and on maintaining the Russian citizens' belief in the government's benevolent conduct toward its imperial subjects. Dostoevskii ignored this lesson and lost his fi rst journal.
Nation, Empire, and Vremia's Final Issue
The scandal of Vremia's closing reminds us of the possible gaps with which the historical evidence records social mood. Herzen's London circle was not unique in opposing the government's repression of the Polish Uprising. It was merely unique in its freedom to voice this opposition. Public opinion about the Polish Uprising within the Russian empire may have been more varied than what can be seen from the press that was allowed to function. Nor was domestic discontent limited to the (silent) liberal faction. To oppose an expensive and repressive empire, the Dostoevskii brothers marshalled their critique from a moderate and nationalist position in line with the journal's philosophy of pochvennichestvo. Strakhov articulates reasons why Russia's disengagement from the Polish kingdom would make perfect sense. The entire issue harmonizes with this message and hazards sharp critiques of the government as well as proposals for restructuring the empire into a benevolent one based on the consent of the governed.
My analysis of Vremia's ill-fated fi nal issue shows that the attitudes of the Russian intelligentsia toward the empire were very complicated. We need to attend to this complexity-in particular to the space between "for" and "against"-and to render it with more nuance. The interweaving of imperial questions with national ones also poses a challenge. Olga Maiorova's recent study traces a productive and highly diverse interplay of national and imperial discourses in Russian culture in the postreform era, a topic that has also generated much historical research. 91 "A Fateful Question" and its journalistic convoy participate in this lively debate and yoke imperial concerns to national ones. Vremia argues that in its ruthless militaristic expansionism, the state belied core national ideals. An imperial policy more in tune with the spiritual values of the Russian nation (peace, tolerance, cultural diversity) would be more likely to secure a strong and lasting empire. 92 Vremia chafes about the bloodstained and expensive empire, but it does not consider a cheaper one a bad idea at all. The journal's authors clearly distinguish between the government's conduct of imperial policy and the very idea of empire. While the former inspires Vremia's critique, the latter faces no objections. After all, Dostoevskii considered empire the best thing that Russia gained in its thousand years of history. The nationalists grouped around Vremia simply wanted a different empire: less costly and more sustainable. They also wanted ambitious imperial agendas to follow Russia's attainment of strong nationhood. Yet however one conceived it, the empire was the ultimate goal of Russian history for Vremia, for Dostoevskii, and for a vast majority of nineteenthcentury Russians. 93 
